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FOREWORD 
THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OF CONTRACT: 
CONTRACTUAL PLURALISM BEYOND 
PRIVITY 
BERTRAM LOMFELD* & DAN WIELSCH** 
Pluralism is the very idea of modern society. At a fundamental level this 
applies to the transformation of the concept of reason. Modernity rejects the 
traditional notion of a substantial reason that is directed at understanding a pre-
given order and a teleologically determined world. Instead, reason is now 
thought of as procedural, as a capacity to create a meaningful world by using 
specific methods, arguments, and theories. For better or worse, what counts as 
reasonable is decided by each field of human endeavor according to its own 
standards. Reason becomes plural. 
The “fact of pluralism” is the starting point for a political philosophy that 
observes deep disagreements in present society not only about the “good” but 
also about the “right.”1 The breeding ground for this development—in which 
reason has been differentiated into autonomous spheres of knowledge and 
practice—is the liberal idea of extending the principle of religious tolerance to 
other controversial questions about the meaning, value, and purpose of human 
life.2 In this sense, liberalism is the historic catalyst for the pluralism that 
characterizes modern society. The medium for institutionalizing the freedom to 
endorse different instantiations of reason is the law. As it were, modernity 
becomes aware of itself in and through the law: “The greatest problem for the 
human race, to the solution of which Nature drives man, is the achievement of a 
universal civic society which administers law among men.”3 The type of law 
deemed best suited to achieve this goal was private law. Only a law whose 
leading idea is the enactment and protection of individual autonomy seemed 
 
Copyright © 2013 by Bertram Lomfeld & Dan Wielsch. 
 This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/. 
  *    Bertram Lomfeld (née Keller) is Professor of Private Law and Legal Philosophy at Free 
University Berlin. 
  **   Professor of Law, University of Cologne, Germany. The papers in this volume are inspired by 
the Villa Vigoni Talks, which took place in November 2011. 
 1.  Cf. T.M. Scanlon, Provocation: Everyone Is a Philosopher!, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 228, 230 
(2012). 
 2.  Cf. Will Kymlicka, Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance, 13 ANALYSE & KRITIK 33 (1992). 
 3.  IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, in ON 
HISTORY 11, 16 (Lewis White Beck ed. & trans., 1963) (1784). 
00_FOREWORD_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/2013  12:44 AM 
ii LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:i 
able to accomplish “the development of all the capacities which can be achieved 
by mankind . . . in the society with the greatest freedom.” 
In the course of unfolding the pluralism of modern society, the distinguished 
position occupied by liberal thought and liberal doctrine gave way to a 
spectrum of concurrent theories about the purpose and the structure of private 
law. All of these alternatives struggle with the fact that liberal doctrine 
organizes itself around the notion of the individual will without addressing the 
relation between individual rights and the conditions under which they are 
exercised. Paradoxically, other than liberalism itself, these theories also respond 
to the liberal opening up of reason. To be sure, the reflexivity that these 
theories add to the reasoning of private law is not necessarily plural in the sense 
that they construe rights as being placed in the context of different social 
domains and their respective values. Economic analysis of law, for instance, 
substitutes the liberal commitment to freedom with another (more narrow) 
exclusive orientation when it models the individual only in terms of a homo 
economicus, the decisions of which are subject to the imperative of efficiency. 
By contrast, deliberative and systems theoretical approaches start with the 
assumption of a legal pluralism and explicitly focus on the relation of different 
normative domains in a given case. However, none of the private law theories 
can claim to judge among the competing accounts. Pluralism in private law 
theory does not just indicate an acknowledged multiplicity of methods within 
legal science. Rather it embodies a controversy over different concepts of law 
that brings about different notions of the subject, the status, and the limits of 
legal reflexivity along with different standards of judicial control. Pluralistic 
theories are not exempt. They are parties to the controversy, too. There is no 
room for a monopoly on pluralism in private law theory. 
Social pluralism has two main institutional backings. The obvious and often 
discussed one is democracy. Continuous possibility of change and the limited 
power of temporary rulers enables a diverse spectrum of political positions. A 
constitutional system of checks and balances and a human rights-inspired 
protection of minorities provide a strong legal basis for ethical self-
determination. Yet the real dynamics of social pluralism springs from another 
legal source. Whereas “democracy” denotes the public background of social 
pluralism, “contract” is its private counterpart. The transformation of modern 
societies from status to contract4 represents the release of pluralism. Freedom of 
contract allows individuals to pursue diverse social goals and private interests. 
Democracy needs legal procedural backing, but remains a political concept. 
Instead, contract is a genuine legal institution. Contract is the legal heart of 
social pluralism. 
Indeed, our society is deeply contractual. Working, housing, consuming, or 
entertaining would be unthinkable without a tight web of contractual relations. 
The institution of contract even colonizes other legal institutions like 
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“property” and “persons” (legal entities). Property rights in apartments, cars, or 
computers are replaced with more dynamic contractual relations such as 
renting, leasing, or services. Also, intellectual property rights are profoundly 
modified with the help of contract. The transformation in both areas of legal 
assignment of rights could be summarized as a question of “access,”5 which is 
opened and regulated by specific contracts. The same is true for legal entities. 
The organizational patterns of economic enterprises are transformed from 
monolithic mega-companies to affiliated groups. Management hierarchies are 
replaced with contractual networks.6 Within transnational trade, contracts are 
even the main tool for ordering conflict resolution. Contract is the main legal 
institution for the future evolution of society. 
Yet contract is in itself a plural institution. Diverse contract laws all over the 
world set out different prerequisites, secondary obligations, and limits of 
contractual commitments. However various the answers are, they circle around 
the same question: When is an arrangement binding and legally enforceable? 
How long and how far is a contractual commitment binding? In addition to that 
legal pluralism, there is also a plurality of theories about the “basis of 
contract.”7 But do these theories have any practical significance? What is the 
use of a contract theory? All contract theories at least touch on the question 
why contracts are binding. Why is it important to know why contracts are 
binding? Because this “why” influences the legal answers about the “when” and 
the “how long” of the commitment. Contract theories reflect conceptions of 
contract. The different conceptions of contract guide not only the making of 
new contract regulations but also every interpretation of a rule of contract 
law—as well as the interpretation of the contract itself. Every contract theory 
implies a theory of contract law. Thus, “contractual pluralism” has at least three 
dimensions. The first denotes the simple fact that contracting parties pursue 
plural interests. The second addresses the legal pluralism of contract laws. And 
the third the pluralistic cluster of contract theories. 
Given this pluralism of contract, there are perhaps as many definitions of 
contract and contract law as there are theories. Yet there is at least one 
common effect of pluralism. Pluralism kills the myth of privity. Put in the 
context of plural narratives, the private character of contractual relations that 
was born in the nineteenth century8 and had its revival in the 1980s9 turns out to 
be a liberal stricture. Pluralism reveals the public dimension of contract. 
Already the liberal picture of freedom of contract included one public 
dimension: state regulation of contract law. The nation-state set up and 
enforced public rules designed to back up private normativity and its 
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consequences. This simple public guarantee of contractual freedom gets lost in 
a globalized world. The global economy knows plural publics. 
As the background of contract supplied by the nation-state often is no 
longer self-evident, the door for contract theory to reflect on the public 
dimension of contract has never been more open. Only a very naïve account of 
liberal theory would frame contract as detached from its institutional 
environment. True, contract is a vehicle for individual self-determination. Yet 
this self-determination unfolds in the sphere of action. According to Kant, law 
refers to the “external and practical relation of one Person to another, in so far 
as they can have influence upon each other, immediately or mediately, by their 
Actions as facts.”10 If law is then about the reality of freedom, legal analysis, as a 
result, must be concerned with the conditions of autonomous action. 
For early liberal thought, therefore, the relation between law and the 
economic system was a central question. Adam Smith was the first to emphasize 
the interdependence of a system of justice and an economic system based on a 
legal order that provides for and guarantees the constituent economic liberties 
as individual rights.11 In his account, the public interest arises from the 
interaction of “natural liberties,” of rules of conduct, and of market forces.12 
The genius of a sustainable liberal concept of law was the understanding that 
individual freedom was indirectly related to the common good through the 
social institution of the market. However, without this nexus of individual rights 
and the common good, society would not have tolerated an autonomy-based 
conception of contract. An explanation of the binding effect of contract in 
purely moral terms is a nice intellectual undertaking, but if this account did not 
reflect the institutional structure of society it would be meaningless as a 
contribution to legal reasoning. This is not to suggest that a teleological 
rationale is the only possible conception of contract. But it should encourage 
the various theoretical approaches to explain their respective visions of the 
relation between the legal institution of contract and those social institutions 
and collective values that make up the context of the very autonomy the law is 
meant to protect. 
The public dimension of contract can remain unexplored as long as contract 
is situated in the context of the nation-state. Under these circumstances, theory 
could afford to reason with its eyes shut to the consequences of privity of 
contract because it would know that the basic structure of society in which 
contracts operated was justifiable.13 However, in a world where contracts get 
 
 10.  IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysics of Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF 
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT (W. Hastie trans., 
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 13.  For the idea of a division of responsibility between private law institutions and public law 
requiring that particular transactions be assessed on their own terms and not be subjected to claims of 
distributive justice, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 267–68 (1993). 
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disembedded from background justice, contract theory is forced to answer how 
contract is compatible with the requirements of its social context. Even a 
seemingly self-sufficient autonomy-based account must explain how contract 
achieves social stability. As has been rightly pointed out, even a liberal 
justification has occasion to show that contract must “express norms of freedom 
and equality that, even if specific to contract and distinct from those underlying 
distributive justice, are fully consonant with the latter.”14 
Given this indispensible public dimension, contract theory always is a 
political endeavor. The articles in this symposium outline the landscape of 
contemporary foundations of contract and highlight the role of the public in 
each conception. Liberal, egalitarian, economic, systemic, deliberative, and 
critical approaches present different faces of a public dimension of contract. 
Different contract theories imply distinct ideas about contractual pluralism as 
well. The different conceptions of contract pluralism presented in this issue 
range from those that factually describe the heterogeneous interests of the 
parties or the diversity of legal orders to those focused on the conflicts of ethical 
values and the collisions of social systems. 
The first two contributions to this issue offer a possible metaconceptual 
framing for contractual pluralism. Both take normative value pluralism 
seriously and try to establish a theoretical structure for a plurality of contract 
principles. Revealing the public dimension in promissory and conventional 
contract theories, Bertram Lomfeld offers a genuine deliberative solution to the 
demand of normative pluralism.15 He frames a comprehensive pluralistic 
account of “contract as deliberation” from the perspective of discourse theory. 
The basis of contract has many ethical roots, which in the context of contract 
law appear as different principles of interpretation. A coherent pluralistic 
theory has to reshape monistic principles as relative reasons within a 
deliberative second-order framework. Such a deliberative theory of law displays 
every social conflict as a collision between different normative reasons. The 
decision of the legislator in favor of a particular rule or the decision of the judge 
in a particular case constitutes a political balancing act between colliding 
reasons. Contracts become deliberative institutions. Parties to a particular 
contract promise each other reasons, the weighing of which they can enforce 
through law. With such a deliberative contract theory the conflict between 
promissory and conventional theories blurs. A contract is a “promise of 
reasons” that can be cashed in a conventional legal framework. Every contract 
then has a public dimension referring to the public giving and receiving of 
reasons. Every contract is a genuine social contract. 
Likewise dismissing monistic normative accounts, Hanoch Dagan presents a 
structurally pluralist theory of contract in which contract law is an umbrella of a 
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 15.  Bertram Lomfeld, Contract As Deliberation, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 1. 
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diverse set of contract institutions, where each institution responds to a 
different regulative principle.16 Nonetheless, his structurally pluralist account is 
an explicitly autonomy-based contract theory. Therefore, he revisits Joseph 
Raz’s account of the relationship between contract law and voluntary 
obligations. He relies on Raz’s starting proposition that the entering of 
voluntary obligations has a genuine social value and that the role of contract 
law should be to protect this practice. Yet he refutes Raz’s further propositions 
about the supportive role of contract law and how contract law in its entirety 
should be guided by the one regulative principle of autonomy. Instead he 
argues with Raz against Raz, relying on Raz’s own account of autonomy as self-
authorship that imposes on the state important responsibilities in supporting 
pluralism. For Dagan, an autonomy-based contract law should offer an 
umbrella for diverse contract institutions. The main task of an autonomy-based 
contract theory is to distill its distinct regulative principles, to elucidate their 
contributions to human flourishing, and to offer reform if needed. 
The next set of contributions focuses on distinct normative contract 
principles. Here, contractual pluralism denotes the evident phenomenon of 
plural interests pursued through contractual relations. Although the theoretical 
approaches in this section tend to be monistic in the sense that one particular 
value structurally trumps others, the mere existence of alternative monistic 
reconstructions of the legal order that can all claim to be equally plausible 
unintentionally confirms the relevance of the fact of social pluralism for legal 
theory. 
In his remarks on liberal contract theory, Thomas Gutmann views the 
modern concept of contracts as inextricably linked to individual rights 
protecting the autonomy of persons.17 Building on a deontic understanding of 
rights as legally respected choices, he casts contracts as tools for the free will to 
enter into normatively binding agreements by transferring one’s rights to 
another person. Private law should focus on the internal relationship of mutual 
recognition between the parties and check if the free will in question is 
compromised. It must respect the normativity of contract that is constituted by 
the equal autonomy of persons. Any instrumentalization of contracts for 
collective ends infringes upon this normativity; contracts must remain 
unrestrained by duties of social justice. As a consequence of the broad 
recognition of the principle of private autonomy in Western legal systems, a 
liberal theory of contract can methodologically afford to pursue a “happy 
positivism.” It criticizes alternative theories for the source they try to derive 
their normativity from. While some theories are rejected for an alleged total 
lack of normative reasoning (namely, sociological jurisprudence and critical 
legal studies), others are deemed to suffer from a pre-modern fixation on duties 
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CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 39. 
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(neo-Aristotelian approaches), consequentionalist thinking (economic analysis), 
or inconsistency with private autonomy (social justice approach). Since no other 
reason for contractual normativity than self-determination of the individual is 
admitted, Gutmann contends that there is no choice of paradigm for the theory 
of contract but that any alternative approach must be parasitic upon the liberal 
one. 
For Florian Rödl, contract law is the expression of a coherent moral 
structure reflecting the idea of human equality.18 His argument is based on a 
hermeneutic reconstruction of the basic structure of contract law. Neither a 
procedural nor an instrumental conception of freedom of contract would be 
able to explain the existence of fairness-based legal norms whose purpose is to 
fill contractual gaps or to scrutinize contracts for unfair terms. Rather, he 
submits, the only way to give a coherent account of the stock of fundamental 
private law rules is to assume that contractual freedom must be exercised in line 
with contractual justice; unfair contracts cannot be claimed valid by appealing 
to contractual freedom. This holds true not just for auxiliary terms but also with 
respect to price. Courts determine a test of fair price (justum pretium) with the 
help of general clauses that incorporate common usage and trade practice. To 
the extent that competition ensures equal distribution of bargaining power, the 
law can refer to the results of countless deliberations among parties to a 
transaction about the fair price of a commodity. This background is also a 
source of the critical potential of Rödl’s approach because it prompts the law to 
identify those conditions that are likely to inhibit the conclusion of just 
agreements, such as, for example, structural market failures. 
In the eyes of Hugh Collins, the expansion of constitutional and human-
rights control of private law indicates the end of private autonomy as limited to 
negative freedom from interference.19 Once the legal framework is understood 
in terms of competing rights, legal analysis is forced to consider the real choices 
available to both parties. In particular, there can then be no remaining scope for 
an unregulated private sphere of freedom to choose a contractual partner. 
Whereas English common law acknowledged only a few exceptions to this 
principle, Collins argues that anti-discrimination laws on the European and 
national level challenge the liberal distinction between a (regulated) public and 
a (unregulated) private sphere in which individuals are said to enjoy unfettered 
choice. Given the willingness of constitutional courts to apply anti-
discrimination rules in the context of private transactions and the family (as is 
apparent in the scrutiny of a will by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra20), Collins concludes that a completely insulated 
private sphere can no longer exist. If law is meant to promote the positive 
 
 18.  Florian Rödl, Contractual Freedom, Contractual Justice, and Contract Law (Theory), 76 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 57. 
 19.  Hugh Collins, The Vanishing Freedom to Choose a Contractual Partner, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 71. 
 20.  App. No. 69498/01, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 334. 
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freedom of all members of a society, the boundaries to the protection of this 
sphere must be set by the competing rights of others, the relative importance of 
which are measured by reference to a test of proportionality. Public interest 
enters private law by the insertion of human rights. 
Lorenz Kähler discusses the emergence of “contract management” to 
enhance the efficiency of contracts.21 IT-based internal monitoring manages the 
contractual lifecycle from the conclusion of the contract to any eventual 
litigation. In order to govern and keep track of a growing number of contracts, 
business corporations increasingly make use of this tool of analysis. Understood 
as a reaction to their sheer number, as well as the length and vagueness of many 
business contracts, contract management adds another level of standardization 
to mass contracting that goes beyond the use of boilerplate. Although in 
principle a voluntary measure to promote efficiency, contract management 
provides the legislator (and potentially private standard-setters) with an 
innovative opportunity for “secondary” contract regulation that does not come 
in at the point of performance of duties between the parties, but instead 
considers how one party deals with all of its existing contracts. For instance, the 
European Gender Directive requires equal treatment of all contracting parties.22 
A form of secondary control is also introduced by the risk-management rules of 
the finance industry, with mechanisms to prevent the contractual risk from 
spreading to third parties. As such, contract-management duties limit 
contractual freedom. At the same time, however, they might prospectively 
replace regulations of primary contractual obligations and thus ultimately 
broaden contractual freedom. 
Whereas this second set of theories locates the public dimension of contract 
mainly in contract law, viewing contractual pluralism as an indicator for the 
plurality of interests within the frame of a respective public legal policy, critical 
legal theory denounces exactly this political power to determine the 
conceptions and realities of contract as a means of social oppression. Along 
these lines Alessandro Somma criticizes the politics of private law using the 
example of the European Project of a Common Contract Law.23 The distinction 
between private and public law constitutes an artificial boundary that was only 
introduced through the bourgeois order of property and the subsequent class 
stratification in capitalist society. The ordoliberal way of social market 
economies, which are located between liberal and socialist orders, does not lead 
to any real kind of emancipation. While this “order of liberation” does not 
destroy its subjects, it establishes a “biopolitical” power that enforces a 
particular way of life. Thereby every ordoliberal “biopolitics” intends to reduce 
 
 21.  Lorenz Kähler, Contract-Management Duties as a New Regulatory Device, 76 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 89. 
 22.  Council Directive 2004/113/EC of December 13, 2004, implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services. 
 23.  Alessandro Somma, Private Law as Biopolitics: Ordoliberalism, Social Market Economy, and 
the Public Dimension of Contract, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 105. 
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social pluralism. Private law, too, exercises such ordering police functions. The 
project for a Common European Contract Law then appears as an ordoliberal 
move to reduce the contractual pluralism within Europe and to enforce a 
unitizing European biopolitics. 
The example of European contract law leads to another genuine contractual 
pluralism that is associated with the globalization of law. Here, the public 
dimension transcends the public policy of one domestic contract law. 
Transnational contracts listen to multiple legal backgrounds and contract laws. 
Within that legal pluralism transnational contracts create or form their own 
legal orders. Not only the legal framework, but the global public is more 
diversified, too. Already within a nation-state, a unified political public is a 
contrafactual myth. At any rate, a transnational public dimension demands an 
even more pluralistic theoretical setting of contract. Transnational contractual 
pluralism denotes plural legal orders and plural publics. 
Peer Zumbansen enfolds the idea of contract from the perspective of 
transnational private governance.24 Within the current global shift “from 
government to governance,” contract celebrates its comeback as the central 
social institution. Contractual governance is the dominant ordering paradigm 
for the lex mercatoria or law merchant, which is the main self-regulating legal 
regime of transnational private interactions. But transnational accounts have 
mostly oversimplified, stripped-down, mechanical concepts of contracting. Its 
reductionist models emphasize governing contracts as key instruments of 
private ordering relations, thereby ignoring the historically evolved, complex 
“embeddedness” of contract. A bridging perspective might attempt to scrutinize 
a direct “public” dimension of transnational private ordering by analyzing, for 
example, compulsory standards in international commercial arbitration. Yet a 
more profound theory of transnational contracts has to find its own 
methodological answer to contractual governance. A transnational-contract-
theory approach scrutinizes the nature of the law–non-law as much as the 
private–public distinction. Transnational contract theory prompts us to study 
the emergence of hybrid, unruly, and messy regulatory regimes as instantiations 
of an evolving legal rationality in the context of world society. 
In a globalized world, states are no longer the stable reference point for a 
public backing of contractual relations. Yet in a paradoxical erosion of 
legitimacy described by Andreas Abegg, the state as central authority has itself 
become more and more dependent on collaboration with private persons.25 
Private contracts concerning administrative action and social benefits, private 
public partnerships, and contractual assignment of public functions constitute 
increasingly important instruments of public action. The contractual structure 
leads to a juxtaposition of law and those subsystems of society that are 
 
 24.  Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public 
Authority and Private Power, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013 at 117. 
 25.  Andreas Abegg, The Legitimacy of the Contracting State, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 
2013 at 139. 
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contractually linked with the political system. This intervention by cooperation 
requires limited freedom to negotiate the means and, ultimately, the ends of 
administrative action and thereby fundamentally calls into question the 
principle of strict “legality of the administration.” In search of new modes of 
legitimacy recognizing the polycontexturality of modern society, Abegg rejects 
rule-of-law legitimacy mechanisms that would extend administrative law and 
enforcement principles to state contracting. The genuinely state-centered 
perspective still adheres to the idea of one great “Social Contract,” which is 
today broken up into multiple smaller contracts between the political and other 
functional systems in a fragmented society. Habermasian democratic 
legitimacy—developed with regard to the constitutional state—allows for a 
supplement of legislation by “justification discourses” arising from the inner 
democratization and participation of affected parties. However, as Abegg 
argues, only a proceduralist perspective adopted by an evolutionary-reflexive 
theory can truly avoid the dangers of political bias. In a procedure involving the 
legal system and its courts, legal academia, and the systems affected, a specific 
kind of “social legislation” is developed to foster each system’s sensitiveness to 
the requirements of its environment. Drawing on Swiss case law, general clauses 
seem an appropriate instrument to be turned into reflexive “regime collision 
rules.” 
A third level of contractual pluralism leaves behind the idea of subjective 
understanding as the premise for social action and focuses on plural social 
environments and systems. For Pasquale Femia, the public dimension of 
contract lies in the common textuality.26 Within his deconstructive method of 
law the textuality of a contract diminishes the importance of the will of the 
parties as a source of contractual normativity. The language of consensus 
conceals that every individual contract constitutes a highly specialized system 
for generating and transferring private power. Through writing, incidences of 
complex social interaction are broken down into distinct actions. Social dissent 
disappears in the dark of a discourse based on professional jargon. This 
pathological selectivity of contracts leads to a “paranomic” situation, an 
epistemic breakage in which normative discourse conceals its actual effects. The 
public dimension of contract thus consists in the difference between text as an 
independent modality of norms and shifts in real power relations. The critical 
counter-strategy of a deconstructive theory thus attempts to publicly visualize 
the power-divisional strategy of contracts through small but incessant ruptures. 
In particular, the application of fundamental rights in private law is able to open 
up the paranomic language of contracts and to draw attention to the political 
dimension of contracts. 
From a system-theoretical perspective, Marc Amstutz is particularly 
interested in the relationship between contract law and the evolution of social 
 
 26.  Pasquale Femia, Desire for Text: Bridling the Divisional Strategy of Contract, 76 LAW & 
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00_FOREWORD_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/2013  12:44 AM 
No. 2 2013] FOREWORD xi 
structures.27 As a social fact, every contract is embedded in a context of different 
function systems, in which subsystems develop in order to fulfill the purpose of 
the contract. For the provision of complex services, several contracts may be 
connected with each other in networks. Through this network, an emerging 
order of expectations develops that imposes itself on the discourses initiated by 
the conclusion of the individual contracts. A strictly bipolar contract law is not 
able to capture the specific mode of operation of networks and is unable to 
decide which of the discourses involved may cause a malfunction of the 
network. Appropriate legal rules for networks can only be achieved when one 
transfers the method for determining the applicable law in cases of a conflict of 
laws to the plurality of contractual normativities in a network. To the extent 
that one determines the law applicable to a particular legal relationship 
according to the social function of that relationship, network conflicts should be 
solved in accordance with that particular contract that ensures the functionality 
of the entire network. 
Also fertilizing systems theory for the purpose of legal analysis, Dan 
Wielsch finally reconnects to the contractual meta-pluralism of the first 
contributions.28 He concentrates on the relationship between rights and their 
social environment. The legal institution of contract helps to stabilize emergent 
social systems of interaction, which extend the spheres of freedom of the parties 
involved. However, the will of the parties constitutes only one of several 
autonomies in whose reference a particular contract is situated. A concept of 
“relational justice” thus obliges the court to consider all relevant social 
references of contractual rights. Only this explication of the public dimension of 
contract makes it possible to judge the appropriateness of a legal rule for each 
individual conflict. Conversely, the recognition of privately created norms as 
law presupposes that the process of norm generation has taken account of 
diverse social perspectives. This is particularly important when the content of 
contracts is formed by standard terms exempt from individual disposition. Since 
this way of contracting is prone to neglect environmental reference, fairness 
tests are needed as public rules of recognition for this form of private 
regulation. In any case, considering the social multi-referentiality of rights is a 
central criterion for legitimacy of state law and private law alike. The concept of 
relational justice tries to contribute to legal theory’s task of determining the 
substantial requirements of lawmaking under conditions of normative 
pluralism. 
Is there a common lesson to be gleaned from these different approaches? 
Could these theories ever enter into a productive dialogue? From a pluralistic 
standpoint it is important to acknowledge that the pluralism of contract theories 
itself has a public or political dimension. Some reflections on contract theory 
offer criteria to evaluate contract theories in terms of “fit,” “coherence,” 
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“morality,” or “transparency.”29 But the reference to common standards of 
contract theory is too simple and is itself rooted in one particular idea about the 
relation between contract and law. This sketch of the theoretical landscape of 
the public dimension of contract attempts to domesticate, confine, and open the 
terms “contract” and “public,” and thereby contribute to the necessary 
reordering of the fragile public–private distinction in general. 
The overview in this issue reveals the political dimension of theoretical 
conceptions of contract. Of course this is not an exclusive phenomenon of 
contract theory. All basic institutions of private law at the same time constitute 
the social framework of our everyday life and are constituted of and influenced 
by diverse theoretical backgrounds. To reveal this often overlooked societal 
dimension of private law is the essential ambition of the private law theory 
(PLT) project.30 Dismissing old and rigid categorizations, PLT piece by piece 
enfolds a genuine public dimension of private law altogether. 
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